I. Empro v. Ball Co. and the Problem of Precontractual Liability

A. Preface
Writing about Judge Easterbrook's impact on contract law without commenting on his decisions in ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Hill v. Gateway is like ordering a Big Mac without the two beef patties. Where is the beef? These two cases are probably the most important and influential contract law decisions of our era. 1 They reshaped the doctrine of mutual assent and received a tsunami of scholarly attention. Four major legislation efforts in the national scale-so far unsuccessful-were triggered by the desire to reverse the holdings in these decisions, and in the judicial following they garnered. 2 Despite the temptation, I chose not to remark on these branches of Easterbrook's jurisprudence. They have been dissected in a host of articles, courts decisions, and symposia. Contracts doctrinalists largely hate these decisions-it has become almost an instinct among contracts commentators to collectively condemn these decisions-whereas some law and economics writers support the decisions. 3 Since my views here will contribute nothing new, I can at best recommend my favorite commentaries on these cases. 4 Instead, I am electing to turn my attention to another of Easterbrook's resounding influences: the problem of precontractual liability. 1 ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7 th Cir. 1996); Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 2 Attempts to override or codify these decisions were at core of several legislative initiatives, including the UCITA, Article 2B of the UCC, the Revision to Article 2 of the UCC, and the currently ALI's Principles of the Law of Software Contracting. See, e.g., James J. Writing not long after Texaco v. Penzoil, the case that stunned the business community and threatened to burst the seam of contract formation and to find binding commitments before negotiations ended, 5 Judge Easterbrook stitched the rupture. His decision in Empro v. Ball Co. has become a staple in the law of "preclosing" contractual liability. 6 It has been featured in first year contracts casebooks as the ultimate statement why there is no liability before the closing. 7 B. The Problem Empro v. Ball Co. is a simple case, almost generic: two firms negotiate a deal, reach some substantial understanding over the terms, memorialize them in a document titled "letter of intent" or "agreement in principle," condition it on board approval, and also agree to iron out the remaining details and finalize the deal in a more formal contract. Subsequently, the negotiations collapse, or one party walks away, and the formal document is never finalized. Is the signed memorandum-the preliminary agreement-binding? Is it a contract? Or can either party freely walk away from it?
As common as this dispute is, there is no simple legal resolution to it. Sometimes these preliminary documents are intended to be binding, other times they are not.
There are various factors in the surrounding circumstances that can help courts identify the parties' intent: the language of commitment that the parties used (e.g., "non-binding agreement"); the importance of the missing terms (e.g., price); conduct indicating that the parties believed they had a commitment (e.g., reliance by both parties); and the like. 8 Some courts are willing sort through the facts of the dispute Baird, Ed., 2007 to figure out what the parties intended. Other courts prefer to simplify adjudication by relying only on formalized agreements and inducing parties to avoid such disputes and be clearer when they memorialize their understandings.
Interestingly, this is an area of contract law that proved trickier to regulate than other areas of contract interpretation. The law requires courts to reach a yes/no decision, all-or-nothing, contract versus no-contract, freedom-to-walk-away versus full-expectation-damages, whereas the situation is fundamentally one of intermediate, half way, assent. On the one hand, it is clear that some substantial consensus has been reached between the parties and that the preliminary agreement is a milestone in reaching assent, and thus allowing the parties to freely walk away would frustrate their initial accomplishment. On the other hand, the parties have also made it clear that additional agreement needs to be reached and some conditions need to be met for there to be a "contract," and thus enforcing their precontractual understanding as if it were a contract (and filling its gaps with majoritarian terms) would deprive each party of the power it sought to maintain, to reject unfavorable additional terms. It is not surprising, then, that case law is replete with incoherent guidance. In one classic case, the court concluded that prior precedents in this area are "in hopeless conflict." 9 Leading luminaries characterized case law as "confusing", "inconsistent", "all over the board", and the "least predictable" in the entire area of contract law. 10 It is also not surprising, when ambiguity reigns, that a Judge Easterbrook decision would surface with a clear position. It is a typical Easterbrook decision: short, forceful, persuasive, lights out. Nevertheless, I will argue that the policy it articulates is socially undesirable.
C. Easterbrook's Solution
The agreement in Empro v. Ball Co. was a three-page letter of intent titled "General Terms and Conditions," for the sale of a manufacturing company. The price and the payment terms were agreed upon. The agreement named some issues that needed to be resolved: a non-compete provision, warranties, a consulting arrangement for the sellers, and "the definitive terms and conditions of this transaction." The agreement was conditioned on approval by the board of directors of the buyer. The crucial term was the "subject to" clause, stating that the agreement "will be subject to and incorporated in a formal, definitive Asset Purchase Agreement signed by both parties". After several months of further negotiations, and before a final formal agreement was reached, the seller walked away from the deal, to negotiate instead with a third party. The suit was by the buyer to enforce the letter of intent.
Judge Easterbrook dismissed it. The letter of intent was not binding, he concluded, because the parties intended not to be bound until the formal definitive contract was executed. Their use of the "subject to" language (twice), without otherwise indicating that their commitment is immediate, reinforces the position that the agreement was not binding until formalized. The board approval escape hatch further demonstrates that the buyer wanted to preserve the right to walk, and did not intend to be bound till later. The buyer also secured the right to get the earnest money back, refusing to commit to even a small measure of precontractual liability.
Finally, Easterbrook points out that when the seller accepted the letter of intent, it stated that "some clarifications" would be needed. In Easterbrook's words, "'Some clarifications are needed' is an ominous noise in a negotiation, foreboding many a stalemate. Although we do not know what 'clarifications' counsel had in mind, the specifics are not important. It is enough that even on signing the letter of intent [seller] proposed to change the bargain, conduct consistent with the purport of the letter's text and structure." 11 Thus, the combination of the subject to wording, the board approval conditions, and the clarifications needed statement indicate that no contract was entered and the parties were free to walk away.
Easterbrook also dismisses the buyer's more modest claim, to at least recover its reliance expenditures-those costs the buyer sunk in reliance on the letter of intent, including the cost of negotiating with the seller, investigating the seller's business and preparing the acquisition. If there is not contract, there is no liability, however measured:
"Outlays of this sort cannot bind the other side any more than paying an expert to tell you whether the painting at the auction is a genuine Rembrandt compels the auctioneer to accept your bid." 12 Easterbrook is clear about the rationale for his decision. Approaching agreement in stages is "a valuable method of doing business." 13 Early in the negotiations parties do not yet know if they will succeed or fail. It is their interest to reach understandings without fear that they will be forced into an agreement that they do not want, one that includes terms to which they did not agree. As Easterbrook explained in a later case with similar facts, "If any sign of agreement on any issue exposed the parties to a risk that a judge would deem the first-resolved items to be stand-alone contracts, The process of negotiation would be more cumbersome (the parties would have to hedge every sentence with cautionary legalese) and these extra negotiating costs would raise the effective price. 
A. Normative Grounds for an Intermediate Liability Regime
In complex deals, as Judge Easterbrook acknowledges, it is technically impossible to tackle all issues simultaneously. Consensus is achieved piecemeal; one by one issues are resolved. Usually, when enough such resolutions are amassed, the parties then decide that some memorialization of the agreed upon terms is useful, and that a structured plan for the remainder of negotiations is desirable. This milestone is not the end, but rather a stage toward a more complete agreement, which is sometimes specifically referred to in the preliminary understanding.
What is the value of this pre-closing memorialization? Surely, the act of signing a letter of intent is more than a secreterial archiving of items. One possibility is that by taking stock of what is already agreed upon and recognizing the mass of accomplishment, the parties create some inertia for the remainder of the negotiations. The parties may believe that the incentive to overcome the remaining issues may increase after most of the agreement is recorded, or that the remainder can be delegated to agents (lawyers), or that some more information is needed to nail down the final issues, or that some of the issues that remain open could be sidestepped, if the likelihood of some contingencies decline.
It is often recommended in negotiation manuals that the harder issues should be avoided early on in the negotiation as they might "place an unbearable strain on overall settlement process". 15 The psychological basis for this paradigm is a "momentum" notion: if the parties tackle easier issues first and build as much understanding as possible, they increase their own motivation and incentive to find ways to resolve the contentious issues. 16 The effort already spent on achieving partial agreement and the dynamic of good will that this effort generated accord a more amenable context for the resolution of the remaining issues. 17 The recording of the preliminary understanding, under this view, helps marshal the parties' good will and motivation to continue.
The economic basis for this momentum paradigm could be an incomplete information account: as issues get resolved, the parties update their beliefs about the expected surplus from the deal. And each party also knows that the other party is performing the same updating. There can be a strategic factor here: each party may believe that by formalizing early understandings, the counterparty becomes more eager to finalize the deal, which would make it possible extract greater further concessions from that party. 18 It is one thing to record and memorialize the preliminary agreement. It is another thing to be committed to it. Can the parties be committed only to what they agreed?
Why would such gradual commitment, coupled with intermediate magnitude of liability, be advantageous in these environments of negotiations-in-stages? One type of benefit, often mentioned in the negotiation literature, is the cognitive effect associated with a gradual compromise. Concessions that may be hard to make if framed as a lumpy, all-at-once departure from one's ideal terms, may be easier to digest in a series of small slivers. 19 Partial commitments effectively carve up of the otherwise hard-to-swallow large commitment. This is the same logic soon-to-bemarried couples invoke in making gradual premarital commitments (e.g., buying
shared assets, moving into a shared residence, opening joint accounts). If it were completely costless, in terms of non-legal repercussions, to walk away anytime prior to the full formal agreement, these milestones would have less value, and, short of self-deception, they would not help the parties make a gradual assent towards cohabitation. A norm (or legal rule) of unrestricted freedom to retract, to reopen resolved issues, and to break the negotiations for any reason, would undermine the gradual compromise idea. 20 Another benefit of an intermediate commitment arising from precontractual understandings is associated with the "integrity" of negotiations. If parties are free to walk away anytime prior to the full blown contract, the negotiation arena will be appealing to individuals who are not "serious" and are not truly interested in dealing. The value of such a surrounding to the serious traders would then diminish.
The signal that entrance to negotiations transmits with respect to the propensity of 19 See, e.g., Robert C. Cialdini, Influence 27 (1984) ("The trick is to bring up the extra [expenses] independently of one another so that each small price will seem petty when compared to the already-determined much larger one.") 20 Lax and Sebenius, supra note 15, at 279-280 (Emphasizing the informal sanctions of breaking contingent agreements); Roy J. Lewicki, et al., Negotiations 100 (2d Ed. 1994) (Advocating that negotiators strategically make only tentative commitments until an entire agreement is reached). a party to work towards a deal is more powerful the greater is the sanction for walking away. 21 This is a standard-and desirable-sorting mechanism.
Still, it might be conjectured that this is too crude a sorting device, that it will deter parties who are potentially serious but not ready to assume some liability. Namely, even a partial precontractual commitment-any limitation of the freedom from contract-might "chill" the incentives to bargain, reducing the incidence of surplus creating negotiations, and thus reducing, rather than enhancing, the parties' payoffs. 22 In Judge Easterbrook's words, parties would fear that "they have bargained away their privilege to disagree on the specifics," which would undermine their incentive to enter precontractual understandings. 23 This intuitive conjecture is misguided. If there is a chilling effect caused by some measure of precontractual liability, it is disproportionately weighty on non-serious parties-those who are less likely to enter the contract and are thus more likely to be subject to the precontractual liability rule. This disproportionate burden on the non-serious parties would deter their entry. The more serious parties would find the liability regime desirable. For one, it would deter and filter out wasteful negotiations. Moreover, it would induce more efficient reliance investments. 24 As recognized in a court decision to which Judge Easterbrook concurred, "the parties may want assurance that their investments in time and money and effort will not be wiped out by the other party's footdragging or change of heart or taking advantage of a vulnerable position created by the negotiation." 25 Such precontractual investments take many forms. Parties forgo opportunities to negotiate with other partners; give up offers and promotions; invest in relationship specific training and assets; 26 acquire information; build capacity; and so forth. These investments increase the value that the potential deal would subsequently divide.
In the absence of some kind of commitment from the counterparty and liability to back it up, each party would fear that these investments are more likely to be wasted or expropriated. Without liability, it is more likely the other party will turn around and walk away. And even if the other party stays, greater reliance investment would make the investing party more vulnerable to hold-up. Thus, if negotiations lead to a contract, the benefits a party can enjoy from its own reliance investments are diminished by ability of the other party to expropriate some of the surplus they create. Since the other party can threaten to walk away, it can reopen negotiations and re-split the post-investment surplus. This hold up problem would reduce the incentive to invest. From a social perspective, the reduced levels of precontractual reliance that result are inefficient in two different ways: Deals that do get formed generate a lower surplus, and some efficient deals that could have been formed are never entered into. 27 According to this view, parties who enter into preliminary agreements without expressly stipulating the liability consequences, have in mind a commitment that is neither full contract nor zero liability, but rather carries some binding force. They want to accord each other some measure of security, thereby encourage each other to keep investing in the success of the relationship, and to screen out, ex ante, frivolous partners. Each party must sacrifice some of its own freedom to walk away in order to encourage the other party to take the chance. The benefit from higher This question cannot be answered without first articulating what exactly is the benefit the liability is trying to generate. In the discussion above I mentioned several potential benefits to precontractual liability-inducing reliance investments, protecting the integrity of the negotiation arena, making agreement easier to accomplish, and more. Each of these objectives might justify a different liability rule.
It will be overly ambitious to claim that all these goals can be optimally addressed by the same rule. Thus, in the discussion here, I will focus on one objective: optimal pre-closing reliance.
In my previous writings on this issue, some of it done in collaboration with Lucian Bebchuk, I explored a variety of intermediate liability rules that, under some assumptions, provide optimal incentives to invest precontractually. 28 Some of these rules place unrealistic informational burdens on courts. There is one regime, however, that places only a modest informational burden on courts and can lead to optimal incentives in a subset of negotiations-those in which parties reached a preliminary understanding.
Imagine a rule that imposes liability on a party who retracts from the terms to which it had previously agreed-any of the terms included in the preliminary understanding. 29 Sometimes the preliminary understating is formalized in a letter of intent, making it easy to identify. Other times it may require some subtlety to identify the set of terms that a party agreed to-the term that the party represented to be acceptable. Once these terms are identified, a retraction would be any attempt by the party to reopen the negotiations over these terms in order to extract a more This no-retraction norm is recognized in a variety of negotiation contexts. In international negotiations, for example, when a negotiating party manifests its position, it is considered improper to "revert to a harder position from a more conciliatory one." 30 Treaties that are negotiated article-by-article and partial understandings cannot be reopened and must be preserved in the final agreement. 31 Even the agreed upon terms in agreements-to-agree, famously unenforceable in private law, cannot be reopened. In treaty law, "there is little doubt that parties can enter in legally binding 'agreements to agree'." 32 Or, to take another example, in collective labor negotiations parties to preliminary and tentative agreements have an obligation to further negotiate in good faith. Courts have developed heuristics to determine what accounts for bad faith. Interestingly, it is often held that withdrawal of tentative agreements or making regressive proposals (two forms of "retraction"),
if not reasoned by a change of circumstances, are evidence of bad faith bargaining. 33 Notice that this no-retraction rule is not equivalent to enforcing preliminary understanding as contracts. If they were contracts, liability for retraction would equal the expectation interest and the court would need to supplement all the missing terms. Also, this rule is not equivalent to a rule that effectively prohibits renegotiation of agreed-upon terms. Under the rule considered here, a party can, after the preliminary understanding, push to reopen its terms and insist on more favorable terms. But this strategy is no longer free. The intermediate liability he would face, if that strategy led to negotiation breakdown, does not block renegotiation; it merely affects the bargaining range in the renegotiation stage by restricting the retracting partiy's profitable maneuvers. It thus provides more bargaining leverage to a party that relied on the agreement. 30 Iklé, supra note 16, at 22-23. 31 Id., at 99 ("The very fact that the parties laboriously negotiate with each other to settle their issues point by point constitutes an implied promise that yesterday's work will not be destroyed tomorrow by reopening these partial agreements".) 32 In order to avoid masqueraded retractions, a court would have to determine if any party's demands regarding the missing negotiable terms are unreasonable. A party would be deemed to retract when he insists on an unreasonable term, unwilling to enter the contract even under the specification of the missing term that, within the range that the parties could reasonably have intended, is the most favorable to him.
Rejecting such a package is as unreasonable as retracting an explicit agreement.
Essentially, then, a party entering a preliminary agreement is making a commitment to its terms, supplemented in all the open issues with terms most favorable within reason to him. He will not be forced to accept, or face liability for rejecting, a contract less favorable than this package of agreed terms plus most favorable gap fillers.
Thus, this liability rule is "intermediate" relative to full contractual liability in several important ways. First, it kicks in only if the other party is willing concede the open terms-a less than likely event. One can imagine that many parties to preliminary agreements would not be willing to concede the open terms in a manner most favorable to their counterparts. In such cases, there is no liability and each party would be free to walk away. Second, even when the liable party is compelled to be part of the deal, the burden involved is quite minor. It is a deal that contains the terms he agreed to in the preliminary understanding, supplemented by the terms most favorable to him. Finally, if, despite it being favorable to him, the liable party refuses to accept this deal, the liability is measured by reliance damages-only those expenditures reasonably undertaken after the agreement. only deal to which it can confidently be said that the defendant manifested her "constructive" intent to be bound. What reasonable grounds would the enforcedagainst party have to reject such a favorable deal? Third, it allows parties to enter preliminary agreements without the fear that they are binding themselves to unwanted terms that some future activist court might install in the contract. Nor are they bound to some fuzzy and unpredictable obligation to negotiate in "good faith."
Thus, it addresses Judge Easterbrook concern that parties ought not fear that they bargain away their privilege to disagree on the specifics. The knowledge that they may be surrendering to a deal that is most favorable to them is not a deterrent but rather an inducement to enter a preliminary agreement. Finally, the rule is easy to Unfortunately, judge Easterbrook did not partition the issues according to this methodology. The statement "some clarifications needed," which the seller included in the cover letter attached to the preliminary agreement, was taken as eliminating any kind of commitment, even to the express terms of the agreement. This is an extreme result. It does not try to reconcile the seller's simultaneous signing and requesting clarifications in a way that would make both acts meaningful. Rather, it empties the signing of the agreement of any meaningful consequence.
The seller's violation of the no-retraction liability rule would lead to a recovery of damages. Since the purpose of this liability rule is to induce optimal reliance, it suffices to compensate the buyer for its reliance costs. Here, the buyer's reliance costs were non-trivial: hiring attorneys to proceed with due diligence, making several trips to investigate and review the company, paying for appraisals, and participating in several negotiation meetings. These are socially desirable postagreement, pre-closing, investments and they ought to be protected by liability.
D. Conclusion: Ways of Criticizing a Judge
The analysis here suggest that judges do not need to walk the razor's edge between no liability and full contractual liability every time they adjudicate a pre-closing case in which the agreement was subject to a formal contract. Currently, the razor's edge methodology leads courts to seek clues about the parties' intent in factors that are too subtle, while recognizing that this formula is often ambiguous. 36 There is confusion whether the parties' intent is an issue of law or fact; whether parol evidence can be included; whether the subject to statement is a condition precedent, and the implications of such category. It is often hard to interpret what the parties' intent was, when they used this language. Courts tend to infer from the breakdown of subsequent negotiations that the original agreement was not binding. Against this, and in attempt to break down the dichotomous nature of the liability problem, I
showed that a pre-closing agreement can be binding but not final. The No-Retraction principle provides one possible grounding for such mechanism, setting the magnitude of liability on a continuum that reflects the quantum of agreement reached by the parties.
It is not altogether fair, though, to criticize a judge-even a creative judge as Easterbrook-for failing to apply a "new" rule, one that is not part of the accepted jurisprudence in the area. Judge Easterbrook felt compelled to choose between two polar outcomes. This is the standard methodology that most courts follow. He may 36 See, e.g., Interway, Inc. v. Alagna, 407 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ill. 1980).
have made the choice seem too easy, overlooking the magnitude of assent already reached, but the choice is still plausible.
The critique, then, is not of the specific outcome in the case. It is a critique of the line of cases for which Empro has become a prominent representative. In a subtle and interesting way, some courts have been breaking away from the dichotomous, allor-nothing methodology, developing heuristics for precontractual liability and for negotiations in bad-faith, which are consistent with the no-retraction norm. 37 Even
Easterbrook's court has been at times innovative in this area. 38 Empro v. Ball Co.
